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I. ABSTRACT 
 
Modernization relies on law as the means of transformation. 
Democratization and development strategies of the last 20 years, 
such as the Washington consensus and its successor: good 
governance and institution building, have embraced the 
instrumentalization of law in order to create democratic societies 
and market economies. In these great processes of transformation, 
from regime changes in Eastern Europe to state building across 
Central Asia, the process of lawmaking rests upon premises that 
have a tendency to perpetuate transition without transforming the 
relationship of the individual to power. This alienizing feature of 
transition is reflected in lawmaking practices. In this paper, I argue 
that a wider participation in the lawmaking process enhances the 
legitimacy of the democratic regime, and it helps to fill the gap 
between the law in the book and the law in action. I rest my thesis 
on the premise that the reformation of laws, and therefore the 
system, is characterized by a dichotomy between the legality and 
the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. I analyze and expose two 
different and contradictory patterns that are inherent in lawmaking 
processes in countries in transition. On the one hand, a rule of law 
society presupposes clear, transparent and predictable rules, a 
certain formalism associated with modern states and societies. On 
the other hand, the flexible nature of transition demands solutions 
outside the legal framework. I use dichotomies such as legality and 
legitimacy, expertise and wider participation to analyze the 
contents of lawmaking practices as well as the role of international 
actors and elites in the democratization and development process. 
Juxtaposing transformation with participation, this paper elucidates 
the practices of modern lawmaking in societies in transition.  
 
I should have sought a country, in which the right of 
legislation was vested in all the citizens; for who can 
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judge better than they of the conditions under which they 
had best dwell together in the same society? 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The process of transition from one political regime to another, 
in the last twenty years, has required structural political and 
economic reforms. These reforms in turn have relied on the role of 
law as an instrument of social change.
1
 Thus for instance, the 
political and economic changes of the 1990s in Eastern Europe 
were followed by the establishment of a new legal order, which 
was necessary to foster democratization, and create the market 
economies.
2
 On the economic front, the transformation of Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s followed the model of shock therapies 
prescribed in the Washington consensus as quick liberalization, 
privatization and stabilization.
3
 During these great processes of 
transformation, the social dimension of the state was either 
                                                                                                             
1. In twenty years of transition in Albania, between 1990 and 2010, 
approximately 3000 new laws and thousands of by-laws were adopted. Data 
gathered from the database of the Albanian Parliament, 
http://www.parliament.al. (last visited April 21, 2011). See generally European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Law in Transition Series, 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/newsletters/archive/archive.sh
tml. (last visited April 21, 2011), for a description on the launch of legal reform 
projects. By Eastern Europe I am referring to all the former socialist countries 
east of Germany, not including the Soviet Union.  
2. In contrast to the democratization in Eastern Europe, a post third 
wave of democratization in Central Asia seems to rely more upon conventional 
norms of democratization through Constitution making and power sharing 
agreements. In Nepal, for instance, the process of transition from monarchy 
towards a republican form of government is relying almost exclusively on the 
adoption of a Constitution, which is one of the conditions of the peace process 
between the Maoist guerrillas and the former royal army. See Reports of the 
Secretary-General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in 
Support of its Peace Process, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/SecretaryGeneralReportsNP.aspx 
(last visited April 21, 2011). 
3. See generally, Alexander N. Domrin et al., Ten Years of Legal 
Reform in the Former Soviet Union: A "Progress" Report, 93 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
235 (Mar. 24-27, 1999). 
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abandoned or relegated to the exigencies of the market.
4
 At this 
moment, we come across the first paradox of transition. On the one 
hand, legal reform aims at democratizing the societies and creating 
the necessary legal framework that would legitimize the new 
regime. The assumption is that legal reform would either be 
forward or backward looking, leading or following social 
developments, attempting to formalize or regulate them.
5
 It does 
so, however, by following one of the two dogmas of development, 
i.e. the neoliberal model or the good governance and institution 
building. In both paradigms, the emphasis is on economic reforms 
and institutions rather than on maintaining the social dimension of 
the state.
6
  
On the other hand, the abandonment of the social role by the 
state undermines the legitimacy of the new democratic regime. 
This becomes particularly acute when considering that the 
totalitarian regime based its legitimacy on performance, that is to 
say on the role of the state as a social regulator. Since most of the 
new governments face an uphill battle regarding performance, the 
social dimension of the state is reduced while the performance is 
simply not there. In a situation where constituents perceive the 
legitimacy of regimes connected closely with performance, the 
withdrawal of the social elements threatens the legitimacy of the 
new democracies. Further, the method of reformation exacerbates 
the distrust towards governments, and in turn the legitimacy of the 
law. The reforms are typically adopted on the basis of a top-down 
approach that tends to reinforce the belief that transition is 
permanent. The process of establishing a new legal order is 
conditioned by the relationship between domestic and international 
actors. The latter have influenced the understanding of law and 
also stimulated the need for legal reform projects. This immense 
legal reform took place in all former socialist countries, in what 
                                                                                                             
4. While the state was obliged to abandon the regulation on social 
services, that did not mean that society was left unregulated. The emergence of 
informal law filled the vacuum left in place by the withdrawal of the state.  
5. See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992) 
(when discussing the presumption that law and society are inseparable and that 
law governs all men). 
6. It should be said the in recent years the two paradigms are not 
mutually exclusive. 
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Gianmaria Ajani calls an international traffic of legal ideas.
7
 It is 
worth emphasizing that the existence of a legal base does not 
automatically translate into optimal operation of laws in everyday 
life. The large number of laws adopted, or what I call “the inflation 
of legislation,” is devoid of any significant impact on how the 
society functions.  
There are two features inherent in the transition process. The 
first is characterized by the problematic nature of reforms 
themselves; the second refers to the process through which these 
reforms are adopted.
8
 In this paper, I use a dichotomy between the 
legality and legitimacy of legal reform projects to analyze the 
practices of actors involved in lawmaking. Against this 
background, I argue for a more participatory process of reforms as 
a step for adding legitimacy to the new regime, and also 
subsequently to the transformation process itself. In turn, this 
increased participation contributes towards enhancing the 
legitimacy of laws. A wider participation of the public is necessary 
to ameliorate the alienation in the relationship of the individual to 
governance and government.
9
 The problem identified in 
democratization processes is that there is transition without 
transformation of the relationship of the individual to power. While 
participation could add legitimacy to laws and address the 
democratic deficit, it does not necessarily follow that the process 
itself is the only missing piece of the puzzle.
10
 The very nature of 
                                                                                                             
7. Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 93, 95 (1995). 
8. On the lack of a theory on large scale institutional transformation 
see Matjaz Nahtigal, Remarks, in Alexander N. Domrin et al., Ten Years of 
Legal Reform in the Former Soviet Union: A "Progress" Report, 93 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 239 (1999) (Matjaz states that “Central and Eastern 
Europe had no broad theoretical knowledge on how reform is to be coordinated 
among several branches of government, or between the government and the 
private sector, the government and civil society or the government and pressure 
groups. We had no experience on how to run things without the government. So 
the immediate withdrawal of government from every level of society caused an 
institutional vacuum, which did not allow for development to arise from the 
bottom up, but, rather, generated an intermediate struggle for private 
ownership.”). 
9. I adopt a wide definition of the public as essentially including 
anyone with a representative function, and, of course, elites.  
10. For an account of the need for local actors to understand legal 
norms see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 
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the paradigms of change, such as the neoliberal prescriptions as 
well as the good governance and institution building, on which 
democratization and development are premised, ought to be 
addressed as well. However, for the purpose of this paper, I focus 
on the dynamics of the process. A wider participation is one of the 
components of a successful transformation process, along with the 
nature of the development paradigms, institutional capacities, and 
the political will of the elites.
11
  
The goal of this paper therefore is to examine the nature of the 
transition process as it is reflected in the operation of legal reform 
programs and lawmaking practices. This analysis and approach are 
in the function of exposing two different and contradictory patterns 
that accompany the lawmaking process in transitional countries. 
On the one hand, the contemporary understanding of a rule of law 
                                                                                                             
 
163 (2003), and Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on 
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 97 (2002). Berkowitz writes that 
for law to be effective it has to be meaningful in the context in which it is 
applied, while Pistor makes a reference to the need for embedding laws in a 
local culture. But see Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms 
and Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 1, 21 (2001), and Thomas W Waelde & 
James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western 
Transplants: A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy, 43 THE INT‟L AND COMP. 
L. Q. 2, 347, 361 (1994) (for an account on the need for institutions in 
transition). Davis and Trebilcock argue that the current wave of legal reforms 
must be situated in a broader agenda of public sector reform if these are not to 
suffer the same fate as the reforms inspired by the original law and development 
movement. Waelde and Gunderson write, “any effort at mere legislative reform 
will fail if it does not cover as well, or more so, the challenges of helping to 
build up the organisations required and the institutional environment within 
which a legal culture can emerge and flourish. Substantive legal reform and 
institution building must therefore be implemented together so that each 
reinforces the other . . . The effectiveness of law in the economic and social 
reality of a nation is usually intimately linked to the institutional set-up of 
government and economic organisations and the shape and focus of social and 
economic forces and their interaction.” While this is true that one needs a 
bureaucracy to enforce laws, I argue that one cannot rely only on the existence 
of a bureaucracy in transitional societies, where by definition state structures are 
weak. Hence, there is a need for participation to alleviate legitimacy and 
implementation.  
11. For the purpose of this paper, I define “elites” as political actors, 
including members of parliament, senior government officials, and also legal 
professionals, the latter essentially constituting a lawmaking group. Regarding 
the role of lawyers as an elite group, see William Ewald, The Logic of Legal 
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 489, 499 (1995) (Ewald writes that lawyers 
constitute an elite lawmaking group). 
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society calls for clear, transparent, and predictable rules, a certain 
formalism in the societal interrelations. On the other hand, the fluid 
nature of transition demands solutions outside the legal framework. 
In this context, it is necessary to note that there is more to the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of a normative order than technical 
considerations dictated by experts. The legitimacy of law, where 
legitimacy means acceptance as the basis of social coordination, 
requires a social and political foundation.
12
 This raises the need to 
ensure a democratic and participatory process of lawmaking, 
which is able to give legitimacy to adopted laws, and prevent 
lawmaking within closed door chambers.  
In this paper, I draw from the experiences that I had while I 
was working on legislative policies at the Albanian Ministry of 
Justice. I also draw upon a more modest experience in Nepal where 
I was drafting a key piece of the legal framework on microfinance. 
What makes studying the Albanian legislative process interesting 
and relevant to the contemporary processes of state building, 
democratization and development is the degree and complexity of 
experiments done and still being done today in reforming the 
political landscape, economy, society and the legal system. In that 
milieu are embedded all versions of Frankenberg‟s comparative 
lawyer, as well as successive mutations of comparative law in 
                                                                                                             
12. See Scott Newton, Transplantation And Transition: Legality And 
Legitimacy In The Kazakhstani Legislative Process, in LAW AND INFORMAL 
PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 151 (Denis J. Galligan & 
Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003). Newton argues that foundation can be based on 
interaction and reciprocity. For other accounts of legitimacy in legal reforms see 
generally Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Reflecting on the Rule of Law: Its Reciprocal 
Relation with Rights, Legitimacy, and Other Concepts and Institutions, 603 
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, 
LAW, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 37, at 44 
(2006). Donnelly writes that changes or developments in law or legal institutions 
can enhance the legitimacy power of the courts or society or they can produce 
legitimacy costs. Legitimacy power can accumulate slowly during a sequence of 
law reform or over the history of an institution. Thomas Franck writes, 
“legitimacy is the quality of a rule, or a system of rules, or a process for making 
or interpreting rules that pulls both the rule makers and those addressed by the 
rules toward voluntary compliance. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (1992). Duncan Kennedy 
also provides a series of contexts in which emerges the concept of “legitimacy 
power.” Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication, A Critical 
Phenomenology, 36 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).  
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action.
13
 Those in turn, are associated with differing political wills 
and legacies of the multitude of domestic and international actors.  
The first Chapter looks at the practices and requirements of the 
lawmaking process, thus illustrating the dynamic of the early years 
of transition, which are common to all transitioning countries. It 
provides a narrative of the political transformation process and 
discusses the rise of the informal sector. I also map key actors of 
legal reforms. Taking into consideration the horizontalization of 
lawmaking, the role of various institutions and exogenous actors 
that participate in reforming the system is analyzed against the 
dichotomy of informal and formal norms inherent in a transition 
process.  
The second Chapter probes the relationship between the 
legality and the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. In discussing 
the lawmaking methodologies, I analyze this relationship vis-à-vis 
the legitimacy derived from a democratic law making process. The 
methodologies of reforming the legislation reflect the background 
and assumptions of the actors involved.
14
 In this context, as Ajani 
puts it, one could speak in terms of an offer and demand of 
legislation.
15
 This approach highlights the effect of the diversity of 
origins of laws introduced to the legal system. 
The lawmaking practices raise more questions than answers 
vis-à-vis the compatibility, adaptability and functioning of 
legislation originated from different legal systems, the enforcement 
of standards and norms in local communities, and the compliance 
with requirements of public participation. They also open the 
Pandora box regarding the implications of adopting international 
standards, and the role of international organizations as providers 
                                                                                                             
13. Günter Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: identity and Politics 
in Comparative Law, 2 UTAH L. REV. 259 (1997) (Frankenberg discusses 
interchangeably the identities of comparative lawyers when advising a foreign 
government. The case in question is based from a business trip to the Albanian 
Ministry of Justice). 
14. For instance, international organizations and foreign donors‟ 
projects were aimed at incorporating international standards as well as relying 
heavily upon harmonizing laws with existing standards by mostly transplanting 
legislation of developed countries, but not only. When OSCE was advising 
Albania to revise its Election Code, legal sources as far dispersed as those from 
the former Zaire to Azerbaijan were presented as examples. I had just started 
working at that time, in the summer of 2000, and the materials were on my own 
desk. 
15. Ajani, supra note 7, at 97. 
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of expertise and norms. One of the problems associated with legal 
reforms projects is the emphasis on the technical rather than 
political or social nature of expertise.
16
 While this approach allows 
legal work to be carried out even in those areas considered 
inherently political with the justification that it could increase the 
legitimacy of the outcome through prestige, more often then not 
the result is the contrary. The recipients of laws often stay outside 
the political and lawmaking process, which in turn is conditioned 
by the central influences of domestic elites and international 
factors.  
The methodology of preparing laws, within the technical 
assistance framework provided by international actors has changed 
twice in the last 20 years. In the early 1990s until 2002, weak state 
structures exacerbated the lack of coordination among various 
actors involved in the reformation of laws. The preferred approach 
of preparing laws consisted of the establishment of closed working 
groups, no more than three to four experts each, working on a 
particular law. As mentioned earlier, during this time, a legion of 
legal reform projects in similar areas, sometimes even working on 
the same legislative measure, but from different perspectives 
created a plethora of results. No one has dared, or dares, to embark 
on a study of evaluating the effects and results of those laws.
17
 The 
myriad of legal reform projects combined with the diversity of 
experts, bringing their own backgrounds in drafting law, resulted 
in conflicts in the codification efforts of the late 1990s.
18
  
                                                                                                             
16. David Kennedy makes a general case on the need to bring politics in 
expertise and comparative law. See generally David Kennedy, Challenging 
Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT‟L L. 5 
(2005), and The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in THE COMMON 
CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 131 (Mauro 
Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., Kluwer Law International 2003).  
17. There are no studies indicating the implementation or the extent of 
harmonization of particular pieces of legislation with international standards 
broadly defined. However, there are reports on the progress of Southeast 
European countries toward membership or association with the European Union, 
which contain passages on the status of different sectors related to the internal 
market, as well as project implementation reports from the World Bank and 
country reports in the WTO. 
18. For instance, the Albanian civil code was drafted within the 
framework of a Council of Europe (CoE) and was adopted relatively quickly by 
the Parliament in 1994, partly because the elements of the market economy 
needed some legal basis. At the same time, two other projects from the German 
Technical Assistance (GTZ), were working on the commercial legislation and 
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The modern era of legal reform is mostly devoted to the 
approximation of legislation with the European Union (EU) 
acquis.
19
 The challenge here, since the EU legislation formally 
does not have direct effect on candidate or associated countries, is 
to transpose the standards laid down by the EU Treaties, 
regulations and directives into domestic laws.
20
 The methodology 
adopted by the Executive branch is to create working groups with 
experts from interested line ministries that often fall back in the 
default mode of transposition of their predecessors of the early 
1990s.  
The proliferation of law, or as I call it “the inflation of 
legislation,” aimed at filling the gaps between the law in the book 
and the law in action is in fact only exacerbating the contradictions 
in the legal system, and simultaneously highlighting the defective 
nature of the lawmaking process. The implementation of 
legislation has encountered two barriers that derive their nature 
from the legislative process. First, there is little understanding in 
the administration about the EU standards and how to transpose 
them into the domestic system. This is followed by a poor 
performance in enforcing laws. The desire for a closer integration 
with the international, or for greater Europeanization, has provided 
a powerful incentive to adopt more laws than it is possible to 
absorb and enforce. Any piece of legislation with a European 
Union label is fast tracked to the Parliament.
21
 The problem with 
                                                                                                             
 
competition, with German experts. The result was that after completing the 
legislation and after the Parliament adopted it, the experts from both projects 
saw that with respect to consumer protection and commercial registry, these two 
pieces of legislation had conflicting provisions and solutions. 
19. The body of European Union regulations and standards of primary 
and secondary legislation, as well as European Court of Justice jurisprudence, 
case law. By modern era, I mean the results of approximation that started in 
2000.  
20. The choice of the legal median is left to the enforcing country, and 
it can either be a law, almost always initiated by the executive branch and voted 
by the parliament in the so called fast track procedure, or executive orders-by 
laws. Within ten years, or sooner, any country associated with the EU, and 
aspiring for membership, has to incorporate approximately 100,000 pages of 
acquis, the number keeps growing each year. 
21. The fast track procedure is widely used in Central and Eastern 
European parliaments, and as a matter of fact, it is adopted solely for the 
purpose of adopting laws required under the relationship with the EU. 
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this is not the existence of just weak administrative capacities, but 
with the approach taken to the harmonization of legislation. 
Second, as the institution responsible for enforcing such 
contradictory and incoherent laws, the judiciary is the ultimate 
bearer of inadequacies of the legislative process. Among many 
complaints from judges is their relative ignorance of the laws, and 
the inability to understand, interpret and enforce legislation. This 
trend is a result of their absolute absence from the lawmaking 
process.  
The third Chapter puts forward some proposals to ameliorate 
the lawmaking process by introducing several ways of assessing 
and evaluating legislation. Almost every report from the 
international community on Albania emphasizes the failure to 
enforce laws. This problem is often attributed to inadequate 
capacities or political will. Instead, it should serve as a cause for 
inquiring about the coherence of the legal reform programs. The 
fact that despite 20 years of transition Albania is still in transition 
facing the same type of problems indicates that questioning the 
human and institutional capital does not fully address the issue. It 
is feasible to assume that in 20 years people would have had the 
time to train and learn, even by a trial and error method. 
Concluding, this paper elucidates the complexity of lawmaking 
in a transitioning process and exposes conflicting aspects of the 
legal reform, which tend to favor legality over legitimacy. The 
implication, ultimately, is the perpetuation of transition and the 
withering away of the legitimacy of democratic regimes. 
III. CHAPTER ONE: TWENTY YEARS OF TRANSITION:  
POLITICS AND ACTORS 
In this Chapter, I lay the context to my argument that attempts 
to reform legislation during periods of transition are inherently 
unable to reflect the complex and ever shifting social forces that 
regulate relationships in a society. This inherent inability in turn 
emphasizes the tension in the relationship between the legality of 
normative measures and the legitimacy of solutions, which 
undermines the credibility of law as an instrument of change. I 
provide a narrative of the transition process in Albania during the 
1990s, focusing on two aspects, first, highlighting the chaotic 
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nature of the process and the erosion of the state associated with 
the rise of informality, and second, the actors that largely drive the 
transformation process. The choice of Albania is not simply based 
on knowledge of the country, but rather one based on the merits of 
the case. The experience of the legal reform in Albania is in itself a 
study in complexity. It includes phenomena common to most of 
the other former socialist countries, and in some aspects it outpaces 
them in its extremity and severity. It is illustrative of a country that 
experienced a period of modernization through industrialization 
and urbanization between 1924-1989. In turn, from 1991 until 
present day, it is systematically and structurally deindustrialized, 
with one fourth of the population leaving to go overseas. 
Furthermore, it is illustrative of a country where democratization 
after Huntingtonian‟s third wave model is being reinjected.22  
A. Politics of Transition and Transformation 
It becomes therefore necessary to say a few words about the 
forces and phenomena that shape the context in which we find the 
seeds of legal reform programs as instruments of change. The 
transition from a communist country towards a liberal democracy 
in the early 1990s relied heavily on law. Hart has argued that the 
need for certainty about rules points to the need for a legal 
system.
23
 This central and formal understanding of law was 
                                                                                                             
22. In this latter context, the country experienced a brief period of 
democratization in mid 1920s until 1939. After 1947, with the consolidation of 
the Communist Party‟s grasp of power, the totalitarian ideology permeated 
every particle of the society, economy and politics, thus treating these three 
components as one. The transition process taking place since 1991 is structurally 
transforming the society, economy and politics, treating each one of these 
components individually. However, I use the term “reinjected” not only to 
denote the above-mentioned cycle, but also to the fluctuations between 
democracy and quasi-authoritorianism that characterized the political landscape 
between 1991-2010. Respectively, 1991-1995 and 2001-1007 were the most 
democratic periods, whereas 1995-2001 and 2007-2010 were periods where 
quasi-authoritarianism was on the rise.  
23. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed., Oxford University 
Press 1994). On the extent of the role of law in social change, see generally a 
summary of legal reform projects published by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Law in Transition: Ten Years of Legal 
Transition (Autumn, 2002), available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/secured/lit022.pdf (last visited April 21, 
2011). 
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considered as the necessary vehicle to achieve society‟s goals and 
inspirations. The centrality and omnipresence of law takes a 
totalitarian dimension when considering the attempts to refer to 
law and to formalize almost every aspect of life, or as David 
Kennedy says “there is law at every turn.”24 Even the political 
rhetoric embraced concepts such as “respect for law,” and “rule of 
law, often ascribing to it a legitimizing function.”25 However, few 
actually understand the meaning of rule of law or agree on its 
implications. Indeed, the formalization of law, or for better words, 
the drive towards formalism, is pervasive and utterly imported.  
Within each society law is embedded differently in the social 
texture, varying in its form, substance, social functions, regulative 
impact and in its legislative procedures.
26
 While the content and 
consequences of a law could be judged separately from the process 
by which it is made, I argue that the process itself has an influence 
on the attitudes and on the acceptance of law. Needless to say, an 
open law-making process enables the law to positively deal with 
major social issues, inform the interested communities about the 
envisioned goals, objectives and procedures, and adjust the role of 
the implementing institutions.  
In a totalitarian state, law has a subservient position to the party 
guidelines.
27
 It thus takes an instrumental role in the Party‟s 
interests. For instance, in Albania the functioning of the secret 
police was not regulated by a legal framework, and its absence did 
not prevent the secret police from enforcing laws, or the “party‟s 
line.” On the other hand, there was an extreme attempt at 
legalizing, or formalizing, other aspects of life. As the communist 
system matured, so it formalized the relationship of the individual 
to the state, extending to the utmost details of life in the gulags. 
The more the socialist state matured, the more laws it adopted. The 
                                                                                                             
24. David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global 
Governance 27 SYDNEY J. OF INT‟LL L. 5, 1 (2005).  
25. It is worth mentioning that there is no translation of the “rule of 
law” into the Albanian language. The substituted version, which supposedly 
means rule of law in the local context is indeed “shtet ligjor,” “Rechtsstaat,” “a 
legal state.”  
26. Marina Kurkchiyan, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet 
Societies, in LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST 
EXPERIENCE 25, 31 (Denis J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003). 
27. The slogan was, “What the people say the party does, and what the 
party say, people do.” 
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establishment of “the rule of law society,” or Rechsstaat, is 
portrayed to correspond with the victory of rules against 
informalism. However, the exact definition of the rule of law in 
countries in transition is ambiguous. It constantly shifts according 
to the exclusive function of what an organization needs to do to 
justify legal reforms projects. In assessing the rule of law programs 
sponsored by the World Bank, Alvaro Santos tracks the variations 
of the concept of rule of law in legal reform programs according to 
institutional and substantive, instrumental and intrinsic criteria of 
classification.
28
  
The abrupt decentralization of governmental powers, along 
with the reduction in competencies and size of the central and local 
governments, resulting from neoliberal prescriptions on the role of 
government as a watchdog, contributed to a gap between law in the 
books and law in action. What followed after the collapse of the 
ancien régime was a move from a highly centralized state towards 
a mutation of the government‟s role in the society following the 
laissez faire doctrine.”29 Law became the epicenter and the rule of 
law rhetoric became the slogan of the day. Regardless of the size 
of government, and in the early 1990s the size of the public sector 
decreased steadily, the number of laws increased on a daily basis. 
This process transformed law into a product. Today, for instance, 
the number of laws produced by any Ministry is the measure of 
effectiveness for that institution, a measure of productivity and 
efficacy, a symbol of its success. It determines the fate of one‟s 
career and furthermore, it determines the understanding of law and 
its relation to the society. Experts and institutions are seen as 
factors of production; law is therefore commodified.  
The economic component of transition is outliving its 
contemporaries elsewhere. It has achieved the goal of 
fundamentally restructuring the economy by utterly 
deindustrializing it. This form of restructuring has allowed only for 
                                                                                                             
28. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" 
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
29. The approach of shock therapies can be conceptualized as a 
fluctuation between “seizing the window of opportunity” and therefore relying 
on discretion and standards to achieve the ends of a liberal democratic society 
with a functioning market economy, and the return to institutions, understood as 
rules of the games, as a precondition for the functioning of the market.  
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the emergence of trafficking of human beings and drugs, as well as 
the remittance of migrant workers. It has systematically 
encouraged immigration by effectively turning it into the single 
biggest input of the GDP, and it has eroded any trust in the 
legitimacy of the system. 
The lack of trust in the legal system results in a surge towards 
the informal, which being more efficient, contributes to the decline 
of the trust in the system.
30
 In the context of customary law, or 
informal normative aspects of the society and formal rules, 
Sigismund Diamond writes that “[c]ustom is the modality of 
primitive society; law is the instrument of civilization, of political 
society sanctioned by organized force, presumably above society at 
large, and buttressing a new set of social interests,” or as Sir Henry 
Maine has famously conceptualized the development of law and 
society as moving from status to contract.
31
 
“Social norms are relevant to legal failure,” writes Galligan, in 
the first place they tend to undermine the function of law as a 
distinct means of social regulations.
32
 They do so by undermining 
or diminishing the special qualities law needs in order to be 
effective.
33
 If law is not seen as important in serving social needs, 
the conditions for its being able to develop in order to do so are 
likely to be missing. Another way social norms are relevant to 
legal failure is when their content conflicts with the law. In the 
case of Albania, social norms associated with the ancien régime 
quickly became taboo, and instead the society turned towards the 
formal and informal law for guidance. What took place can be 
described as a competition of forces in the vacuum resulting from a 
                                                                                                             
30. A perfect example of the informalism in the economy and the 
silence of the legal system is the phenomenon regarding the financial “pyramid” 
schemes of 1995-‟97. Promoted by every single international organization with 
a presence in the country as a success story among Central and Eastern 
European countries, “a poster child,” the Albanian government encouraged the 
system of informal money lending. The epilogue of this two year-old process 
consisted of the presence of a stabilization police mission of the European 
Community in Albania in order to restore public order after the collapse of the 
“pyramids.”  
31. Sigismund Diamond, The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom, 
38 SOC. RES. 42 (1971); SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861). 
32. Denis J. Galligan, Legal Failure in Post-Communist Europe, in 
LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 1, 4 (Denis 
J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).  
33. Id. 
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lack of social norms to operate in a free society on the one hand, 
and the lack of the enforcement of laws on the other.  
During the last twenty years, there is a parallel development of 
social norms and legal formalism. The former is a product of 
peripheries: people cut off from the chores of running a state. The 
latter is a newborn, a transplant, a product of the center, the 
nation‟s capital, where the domestic cooperates successfully with 
the international. The surge of formalism as the way of 
understanding law came from the center, from adopting policies 
related to the necessities of the market, that is to say the demand 
for clear, precise, and systemic laws that are supposed to guarantee 
the functioning of the market and to attract foreign investments.  
The change in the understanding of development results in the 
change of rhetoric on the meaning of rule of law. Whereas 
Washington consensus policies ascribed an instrumental function 
to the law in eradicating the past and providing for the future, 
relying both on formal and informal norms, the new development 
strategy of the mid to late 1990s based on good governance, 
foregrounds the law.
34
 This latter approach treats law not only as 
an instrument of change, but as the goal of transformation, heavily 
vested with formal characteristics.  
A similarity between these two strategies is in the technical 
nature of the legal reform. The first focuses on questions of 
efficiency, whereas the second on questions of good governance, 
rather than on questions of distribution or government. The 
elimination of the political and therefore of the role of ideology in 
the functioning of the market and good governance, is done in the 
name of expertise and technicality that sees win-win situations. 
However, it is a hard sell to maintain that law is merely technical 
in nature, and there is no reason to assume that they will be 
effective on their own.
35
 Reforming legislation is ultimately a 
                                                                                                             
34. See David Kennedy, The New Law and Economic Development, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David Trubek & Alvaro 
Santos eds., Cambridge University Press 2006). 
35. In an article on the role of law in political transformation, Ruti 
Teitel argues that the previous politicized nature of law and adjudication 
partially justifies non-adherence during the transition. This understanding of the 
rule of law as anti-politics is a common theme. Ruti Teitel, Transitional 
Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 7, 
2009, 2030 (1997). 
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political objective that needs a political coalition in place to 
support it, and public acceptance to enforce it.  
The two paradigms of development transcend political 
divisions. In three consequent periods 1992-1997, 1998-2005, and 
2005-2009, governments from both ends of the political spectrum 
have adopted the above-mentioned strategies. During the first 
period informality went to the extreme.
36
 Informal economy, and 
informal relations in the public administration. The late 
governments of 1997-2009, under the new paradigm of governance 
as development have taken steps at formalizing the economy and 
public administration. However, it does not mean those efforts 
have made any impact on the relationship of the individual as a 
political animal to the government and power. While in the 
socialist regimes it was accepted that the will of the individual was 
subsumed to the will of the collective, the new democratic regime 
has yet to provide the emancipation of the individual for which the 
socialist regime was changed.
37
 In the new system, the individual 
has become unhinged and there is a total sense of alienation from 
the society and a strong move towards familial amoralism. 
This narrative on the complexities of transition from a 
communist legal regime towards a liberal democratic legal order 
highlights the dilemmas and challenges that a government faces 
when at the same time it attempts to behave both pragmatically and 
visionary, legally and politically, in order to control the chaos and 
direct the transformation.  
The fluidity of the relationship between law and politics, or 
legality and legitimacy, is well illustrated by the phenomenon of 
political round tables. Whenever there is a political crisis, 
regardless of the nature and motives, usually the party in power 
would posit itself as the defender of the legality of some normative 
act, or institution, such as preferably the Constitution or the courts. 
The challenger, in its attempts to shake the legitimacy of the 
system, would demand a solution outside the regular institutional 
                                                                                                             
36. The 1997 financial crisis was attributed to the collapse of the 
“pyramid schemes.”  
37. On the political transformation and the role of values see generally 
Teitel, supra note 35, at 2026 (Teitel holds that no one rule of law value is 
essential in the movement toward construction of a more liberal political 
system).  
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channels. In a situation like this, the role of the international 
community is virtually or realistically emphasized by both parties. 
Never allowing a good crisis to be wasted, the international actors 
would strive to find followers in need of patronage. This latter 
game is carefully played out, without giving direct messages, but 
rather subtly hinting and confounding the local actors with 
ambiguous messages. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, has become the default player, 
accumulating legitimacy for itself and also giving legitimacy to its 
solutions. On the one hand, international actors are involved head 
over heels in promoting an institutional and formal legal culture, 
the rule of law society, and on the other hand, the adventurism and 
quest for solutions outside the institutional framework is rewarded 
as an adequate response to the difficult nature of transition.  
The relevant point here is not about the fact that the Albanian 
parties disregard the requirements of the rule of law, after all the 
political rhetoric emphasizes that they are not fully matured 
democratic actors. Instead, it is the blessing of the international 
community for orchestrating solutions outside the box.
38
 In these 
situations, the line between political solutions and respect for the 
rule of law is extremely thin, reflecting an ever present dichotomy 
of “engagement with local leaders, in other words the informal, 
and the promotion of respect for the rule of law.
39
 
The axiom that law should be recognized as having an 
important part in social organization is questioned by the primary 
actors who adopt it. Savigny‟s writes that “[l]aw is only law where 
it maintains a close relationship with the common consciousness of 
the people,” the key element in the creation of public confidence in 
the legal system is the belief that rules agreed to in a democratic 
manner are followed by the entire society and by state structures.
40
 
The rise in the authority of international factors, throughout 
twenty years of transition, as the ultimate arbiter and source of 
legitimacy in determining constitutional solutions outside the 
                                                                                                             
38. There are several explanations for the failure of law, ranging from 
weak democratic principles to old mentality from the socialist past.  
39. This latter point is illustrated by the engagement of international 
actors with locals in the political crisis of 1997.  
40. FRIEDERICH VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 
(Madras: J. Higginbotham 1867).  
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institutional framework, as well as in the top-down approach to 
disregarding legal formulas, has created the belief of politics über 
alles. It is not clear how this situation fits with the description and 
final analyses of legal reform projects and workshops that train 
politicians to think in legal terms. It is not altogether uncommon 
for the same actors to be encouraged to find solutions outside the 
system, and the next day to participate in training on the absolute 
authority of institutions and the rule of law. This latter concept is 
seriously pursued in transforming the local culture by sowing the 
concept of law as incubated from the everyday, able to function 
within the limits that insulate judges and decision makers from 
outside influences.  
The discussion of political culture extends more specifically 
into the question of access to the legislative process. Whenever 
people are not effectively consulted in the development of law, and 
have little reason to view institutions as legitimate, they do not 
own the law. Consequently, they perceive little obligation to obey 
it, their decisions on compliance resting on an assessment of the 
coercive power of the state.
41
 In this case the only way to succeed 
in making laws work is to enforce them with impunity.
42
  
The characteristics of the modern state emphasize the 
rationality of law and the need for adopting legislative procedures–
in particular to contend with inflationary tendencies in legislative 
production—so as to guarantee the quality of legislation and 
implement its results. The application of law sometimes takes 
tyrannical features, reflecting a Weberian sense of the drive 
towards bureaucratizing any aspect of life in an organized 
society.
43
 The indispensability of acting according to the legal 
                                                                                                             
41. Neil MacFarlane, Politics and the Rule of Law in the CIS, in LAW 
AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, THE POST COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 61, 74 (Denis J. 
Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).  
42. This leads to an interesting comparison of the intensity of 
enforcement of laws and deeply rooted social norms. The Northern part of 
Albania functioned under the norms of the Kanun of Leka, a 500 year-old 
formalized customary law, that even existed during the Ottoman occupation, and 
regulated most aspects of family, civil and penal law. The communist 
government enforced with an unprecedented impunity its laws, and especially in 
the Northern part, and with great success. However, as soon as communism fell, 
the norms of the Kanun resurfaced almost immediately.  
43. MAX WEBER'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Charles Camic et al. eds., 
Stanford University Press 2005). 
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process is attributed to the strengthening of the rule of law vis-à-vis 
ordinary people, and disregarding its relation to the political class. 
In this context, law can demand absolute fanaticism to the 
formality of say issuance of birth certificates, where it can be 
scrupulously implemented. From the perspective of a political 
party, a formal approach to law can threaten the fragile democratic 
nature of the state, and thus any attempts at reinforcing legality are 
swiftly denounced as authoritarian actions by the state.  
In authoritarian regimes the legislative process by definition is 
hermetic. Whereas, the systemic changes of the 1990s attempted to 
constitute a clean break regarding the substance of legislation, we 
cannot say the same for the lawmaking process.
44
 This is not to say 
that I am overlooking the significance of the content of new rules 
creating new rights and obligations. After all Hart said that “. . . 
some of the distinctive features of a legal system lie in the 
provisions it makes . . . ,” however my interests in the procedure 
are closely connected to the outcome. In this context there is a 
relationship between the domestic and international factors that 
dominate the process.  
B. Actors of the Lawmaking Process 
In this section, I narrate briefly a panorama of the main actors 
and their activities involved in legal reform in Albania. I map some 
the most influential actors, without necessarily attempting to 
comprehensively and exhaustively covering who‟s who or who‟s 
doing what. In this context, I provide a typology of some of the 
most influential actors involved in lawmaking.
45
 There are two 
broad categories that could be used to characterize the actors 
involved in lawmaking. That is to say I group them according to 
their origin. In this sense, there are international and domestic 
actors. Each has its own sub-division between state and non-state 
actors.  
The international actors involved in legal reform programs in 
Albania can be divided in two groups. The first consists of 
international organizations, most notably, the European Union 
                                                                                                             
44. Hart, supra note 23.  
45. Influence in this context is related to the perceived power that is 
exercised by the said actors. 
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(EU), Council of Europe (CoE), and World Bank (WB). The 
second group consists of donor countries acting through their own 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, most notably 
the German Technical Assistance (GTZ), United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and Central and Eastern 
European Legal Initiative (CEELI). All of these groups work with 
the local government and non-state actors in conceptualizing and 
implementing legal reform programs.  
The European Community established contractual relations 
with Albania in 1992 with a Trade and Co-operation Agreement 
that promoted trade on the basis of non-discrimination and 
reciprocity. This agreement did contain a provision on the 
approximation of legislation in the areas of the internal market, but 
it lacked an institutional approach for large-scale legal reform. 
However, the “great leap forward” in the EU-Albania relations 
took place with the launch of the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans in 1999.
46
 It was aimed at 
assisting the Southeast European countries to undergo a political 
and economic transition that prepared them for a new form of 
contractual relationship with the EU known as stabilization and 
association agreements. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreements (SAA) combine political and economic conditions, 
such as respect for democratic principles, reform of the judiciary, 
and strengthening links of the countries of the region with the EC 
single market. They foresee the establishment of a free trade area 
with the EC and set out rights and obligations in areas such as 
competition and state aid rules, intellectual property and 
establishment, which are supposed to allow the economies of the 
region to integrate with that of the EU.
47
 The Stabilization and 
Association Agreements contain provisions for the approximation 
of domestic legislation with the EU acquis in two stages during a 
10 year period.  
                                                                                                             
46. As a framework, SAP combined various instruments, an assistance 
program (CARDS), technical advice, trade preferences, co-operation in fields 
such as justice and home affairs, and political dialogue. 
47. See The Stabilization and Association Process, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_d
oes_a_country_join_the_eu/index_en.htm (last visited April 21, 2011). 
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Each year, a national plan for the approximation with the 
acquis specifies the legal areas and measures that are to be 
harmonized with the EU standards.
48
 It is the largest and most 
influential package of reformatory instruments adopted each year 
as part of the EU conditionality for candidate for membership 
countries. The first areas that are targeted include competition law, 
intellectual property law, standards and certification law, public 
procurement law and data protection law. Legal approximation in 
other sectors of the internal market is an obligation to be met at the 
end of the transition period. During the second stage of the 
transitional period the approximation of laws will extend to the 
elements of the acquis that are not covered in the first stage.
49
  
During the negotiation period, a Consultative Task Force 
(CTF) of the European Commission and Albanian government 
examines the progress of legislation. Every six weeks the 
Executive is obliged to submit a progress report to the Commission 
on the status of legislative and institutional measures identified 
during the CTF, negotiations and in the European Partnership 
document. In addition to this, the launch of the TAIEX assistance 
for the approximation of legislation, monitors changes in 
legislation on a monthly basis.
50
  
The Council of Europe is an example of an intergovernmental 
organization where the Member States, at least conceptually, have 
greater influence in determining the influence of CoE in their own 
domestic legal reform projects. However, this is not the case with 
the former socialist countries. Legal reform programs have been on 
                                                                                                             
48. Otherwise referred to as simply NPAA, containing annual 
legislative and institutional measures to be adopted with a year in order to 
implement Community legislation and raising administrative capacities to 
enforce them. 
49. Excerpts from the draft European Community and Member States 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with Albania (unpublished material) 
(2004). 
50. TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
Instrument of the Institution Building unit of Directorate-General Enlargement 
of the European Commission. Its aim is to provide to the New Member States, 
acceding countries, candidate countries, and the administrations of the Western 
Balkans, short-term technical assistance, in line with the overall policy 
objectives of the European Commission, and in the field of approximation, 
application and enforcement of EU legislation. Assistance is also provided to 
those countries included in the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, as well as 
Russia. 
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the agenda of the Council of Europe since the beginning of the 
„90s.51 Its assistance has focused on drafting legislation in civil and 
criminal areas, consistent with CoE conventions and treaties. In 
particular, legal instruments such as the civil code, the 
Constitution, an anti-corruption package, and special legislation in 
the criminal area have all been prepared with CoE expertise.
52
 It 
has been a working practice and understanding between Albania 
and CoE, that the Ministry of Justice, or the Constitutional Court 
would submit major draft laws
53
 to CoE‟s Legal Affairs 
Department for opinion and expertise, or ask for opinio juris. In 
this context, there was a silent agreement between CoE and the 
Executive branch that in their relations with the Parliament, or the 
public, a draft law would be considered prepared with CoE 
expertise as long as it was submitted to it, without CoE necessarily 
issuing an opinion. Labeling a particular law with CoE brand 
strengthens the legitimacy of actors and silences political conflicts.  
The World Bank has been involved in four different ways in 
legal reform programs. It has traditionally characterized 
governance as neutral and technical in character, thus paving the 
way for reforming the legal systems of host countries.
54
 The Bank 
has contributed to the development of legislation in the areas of 
                                                                                                             
51. The CoE has focused on the process of lawmaking as well. One of 
its projects was to support member states‟ administrations in their efforts to 
improve the quality of law making. The project‟s activities aimed at promoting 
application of a uniform law-drafting technique and style and identify and 
disseminate best practice concerning the management of the preparation, 
discussion, adoption and publication of legislation. Its major themes included 
transparency of the legislative process where the project‟s activities promote 
more active consultation of external interested organizations and civil society 
representatives on draft laws and regulations. Broad consultation was also one of 
the principal tools to enable evaluation of the impact of legislation, which is 
another important activity of the project aiming at improving the stability of 
legislation. The project dealt with issues concerning better access to legislation, 
including the functioning of the official gazettes and design of electronic legal 
databases. 
52. Data from the Council of Europe, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=3&MA=999&
PO=ALB&SI=2&CL=ENG (last visited April 21, 2011). 
53. Usually these are draft laws dealing explicitly with political ends. 
This practice is of importance to the executive but also to other political forces 
because it can rubber stamp approval or disagreement to their initiatives thus 
eliminating most of the contested domestic debate.  
54. WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK‟S EXPERIENCE 
(1994). 
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public procurement, property registration and property law, 
bankruptcy, collateral laws and laws on the structure of the 
judiciary. Its Legal and Judicial Reform Project of 2000 reflected a 
new development paradigm that treats good governance and rule of 
law as a development strategy. Despite millions of dollars spent 
mostly on foreign expertise, the results of World Bank‟s 
engagement in legal reform have been disappointing. One of the 
components, the improvement of the legal education at the Law 
School of the University of Tirana has not given any particular 
results.
55
 The legal education in the country is by all domestic and 
international comparisons anemic, to say the least. A project to 
rehabilitate the school actually left the school in shambles. In an 
act of triumph of hope versus the experience, the Bank spent 
considerable funds in futile attempts to build an arbitration center 
in Tirana, a country where it is fairly easy to bribe any judge, 
despite numerous ethical and criminal provisions prohibiting it. To 
this day, after at least six years of existence, the center has still to 
be used.
56
 The transition process fuels distrust in government and 
authorities. In this case, how the World Bank tried to bridge the 
distance remains a puzzle. In this context, what is there to prevent 
anyone from corrupting any arbitrator, when there are no 
regulations against the conflict of interests or subjecting arbitrators 
to the jurisdiction of the penal code? Fast tracking the adoption of 
ethical codes for arbitrators won‟t solve the deeply entrenched lack 
of trust towards any institutions. Furthermore, a stakeholder 
approach adopted by the World Bank to encourage local 
authorities to participate in formulating and implementing its 
recommendations did not make any difference in the process of 
                                                                                                             
55. This particular component aimed at funding twinning arrangements 
to train faculty staff abroad and technical assistance; strengthening the 
institutional capacity of the Law School and funding textbook preparation and 
teaching materials, financing investments, and rehabilitating and expanding the 
premises of the law faculty building. 
56. World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform in Europe and Central Asia 
(202), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=301446&pagePK=14
1143&piPK=399272&theSitePK=301412 (last visited April 21, 2011). 
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adopting national strategies.
57
 The process is as hermetic as it ever 
was.
58
  
The second group that has contributed considerably to legal 
reform programs consists mainly of government sponsored 
organizations, such as the GTZ,
59
 USAID,
60
 and CEELI.
61
 The 
context for their involvement is the international aid allocated by 
donor countries, and channeled through them either in the form of 
direct grants, but mainly in the form of technical assistance. 
Benefiting from their own expertise and financial resources at 
hand, they become influential sources of power and legitimation 
for the host government and local actors. As it will be discussed 
later in the paper, reliance on dogmatic premises, such as the 
USAID‟s paradigm of creating legal systems that better support 
democratic practices, or twin competition and rivalries among 
                                                                                                             
57. See World Bank Projects and Programs, 
http://www.worldbank.org.al (last visited April 21, 2011). The Strategy went by 
the name of National Strategy for Economic and Social Development.  
58. I was in charge of conceptualizing legislative policies at the 
Ministry of Justice and despite my position, neither my colleagues nor I was 
ever involved in the World Bank legal reform projects.  
59. GTZ in Albania, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-
zentralasien/648.htm (last visited April 21, 2011). The bilateral cooperation 
between GTZ and Albania began in 1988, even before the Communist era had 
ended, and it focused mainly on the economic sector. In this framework the legal 
expertise of the GTZ has been influential to the development of the Albanian 
commercial legislation and registry of companies, civil procedure, insolvency 
law, and recently of the competition and consumer protection laws. 
60. USAID in Albania, Rule of Law, http://albania.usaid.gov (last 
visited April 21, 2011). Its programs aimed at improving the professional and 
ethical performance of the judiciary and judicial institutions, promoting anti-
corruption and avoidance of conflicts of interests, land titles, mobilizing citizens 
to demand accountability and transparency from the government, promoting 
public awareness and education, domestic violence and the new family code. 
61. CEELI activities in Albania, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/europe_and_eurasia/albania.html (last visited 
April 21, 2011). The Central and Eastern European Legal Initiative (CEELI) 
was active in Albania right after the collapse of the regime in 1992. It supported 
Eastern European countries and not it is focusing on Central Asia. Since 
commencing its program CEELI's major projects have included: substantial 
assistance in support of the drafting of a new, democratic constitution, adopted 
through a popular referendum in 1998; promotion of judicial independence by 
supporting the creation of the Albanian Magistrates School and facilitating the 
establishment of the National Judicial Conference; and substantial support of 
legal profession reform and legal education by providing expertise and 
assistance to the National Chamber of Advocates. From 1998 to 2001, CEELI 
conducted a Criminal Law Reform Program, and from 2002 it worked in the 
anti-corruption campaign. 
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organizations can serve as illuminating lessons for modern day 
lawmaking and democratization.
62
  
The domestic actors can be divided in governmental actors, in 
particular the Parliament and Ministries, and a potpourri of sub 
national non-state actors. The latter are often created and 
maintained through family ties to the government, or through 
alliances. Based on that connection, a rotation of fortunes for these 
organizations takes place whenever the right or the left come to 
power. Formally, Article 81§1 of the Constitution gives the right to 
initiate laws to the Council of Ministers, members of parliament, 
and 20,000 voters.
63
 An interesting shift in legislative powers can 
be traced to the rise of the Executive branch as the predominant 
actor in lawmaking. Approximately 99% of all legislation 
approved by the Parliament is initiated by the Council of 
Ministers.
64
 Article 26 of the law “On the Organization and 
Functioning of the Council of Ministers” recognizes the right of 
legislative initiatives only for ministries and their dependent 
agencies. Every ministry proposes legal acts in accordance with the 
area of competencies and with the activities of the dependent 
agencies and central institutions. Among the ministries, the most 
influential is the Ministry of Justice, which not only has the right to 
initiate laws, but most importantly is the gatekeeper for the 
compatibility of laws. 
The Ministry of Justice, reestablished in 1990 after three 
decades of inexistence in the socialist regime, where the 
presumption was that the state and the party were always right 
hence there was no need for public defenders, practicing lawyers 
and a Ministry of Justice, is the principal state institution 
responsible for the implementation of general government policy 
                                                                                                             
62. As it will be discussed later in the paper, the rivalry was between 
two German organizations, GTZ and IRZ. Since 2000, the GTZ and IRZ, two 
leading German organizations shifted their focus toward providing the impetus 
for domestic reform and regional cooperation for a closer rapprochement with 
the European Union. The common areas of work and competence lead to a 
serious rivalry among these two organizations for funds which both of them 
received from the funds allocated by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
Albania.  
63. The Albanian Constitution is one of the latest constitutions of 
Eastern Europe, adopted by a referendum on 28 November 1998.  
64. This is an estimated number from my own experience at the General 
Department of Codification in the Ministry of Justice.  
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in the field of justice and is generally responsible for justice and 
legislative reform.
65
 Through its Directorate of Codification it has 
a central role in the preparation of government‟s legislative 
policies and legislation, and most importantly in checking the 
compatibility of draft laws and other normative acts.
66
 
The problem with the legislative actors is twofold. As part of 
the regulatory scheme, the Constitution empowers the MPs with 
the right to initiate legislation. However, as the statistics show, this 
right is used in very rare occasions.
67
 It looks like the 
transformation of the society through law is a task serious enough 
not to be trusted exclusively to the parliamentarians. Downgrading 
the role of Parliament from the legislator into the approver, or 
rubber stamp, directly and gravely influences the parliamentarian 
basis of the state.
68
 On the other hand, there is a modus operandi 
among the international organizations, governmental sponsored 
organizations and the local government and organizations that 
foster a culture of self-perpetuation and legitimization for the 
conceptualization and implementation of legal reform projects. 
These legislative practices effectively restrict access to lawmaking, 
and there are no incentives on the part of the main actors to change 
the status quo.  
The relationship between democratic decision-making and rule 
of law principles is a two way street. Just as democracy rests in 
considerable measure on the rule of law, the latter rests in turn on 
democratic institutions and processes. Hence a balanced 
relationship between the rule of law and a democratic legislative 
process is needed to ease the transformation of the regimes. The 
legislative process in Albania during 20 years of transition displays 
chaotic characteristics, giving few opportunities to the public to get 
it involved in the lawmaking process.
69
 In this context the notion of 
                                                                                                             
65. Law No. 8678, dated 14/05/2001 “On the organization and 
Functioning of the Ministry of Justice.” 
66. Id.  
67. Approximately 99% of the laws are initiated outside the parliament, 
with the latter always voting in favor of tabled laws. Data from the Albanian 
Parliament, www.parlament.al (last visited April 21, 2011). 
68. Albania is a Parliamentary Republic, according to Art. 1 of the 
Constitution. 
69. According to the OSCE Legal Sector Report: Albania (2004), public 
confidence in the Albanian legal sector is low.  
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law as an instrument of reform reflects a top-down approach. 
Despite some merits to this approach, the need for bottom-up 
considerations takes a more accentuated role in democratic 
societies and is a legitimate one in the prism of participatory 
democracy.
70
 Direct participation could increase access to the 
political system and greater voters‟ involvement in the legislative 
process, thus giving more legitimacy to the system. 
IV. CHAPTER TWO: THE TRAFFIC OF LEGAL NORMS 
Legal reform does not take place in a vacuum. The need to fill 
gaps in a short time, combined with international pressure to 
stimulate the need creates an environment that is forced to receive 
norms and institutions. This process resembles a sophisticated 
system of offer and demand for legal norms.
71
 Expertise and 
financial rewards are key mechanisms to the functioning of the 
system. The feasibility of projects relies mostly on the origin of the 
organization(s) involved. The more Western an organization is, the 
higher the chances for funding and trading in influence. Prestige 
carries a lot of weight. 
In this chapter, I attempt to elucidate the dark sides of legal 
engineering. In particular, I draw attention to the practices of legal 
experts and the form of expertise involved in lawmaking in 
Albania and Nepal, where I have had the opportunity to witness 
first hand how laws are made. I also draw upon some theoretical 
frameworks of comparative law to help me navigate and streamline 
the information that I gathered while working on legal reform 
programs. A particular discussion is dedicated to the workings of 
the legislative process, which is contrasted with the Constitution 
making process. While I make the argument for more inclusive 
participatory politics in lawmaking, I also caution against the 
                                                                                                             
70. It is obvious that the adoption of Napoleon‟s Civil Code was of 
benefit not only for the French society but also it had a strong resonance in other 
European countries as well, which as a result of the spill over effect incorporated 
that code into their domestic legal systems. On the other hand, the paradoxes 
that associated the communist legal reform regarding collectivization and the 
crimes against state are an example of seeing the law as a mere instrument of 
government.  
71. Ajani, supra note 7, at 97.  
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formality of the process as substituting the political will of the 
parties.  
If law is made to be a means to an end rather than vice versa, 
then it follows that it should take into account the moral and social 
norms of a particular society.
72
 According to Merryman, legal 
reform either tinkers with the legal system, follows or leads the 
social change.
73
 Two immediate problems are associated with legal 
reform projects. The first is the evident mismatch of the supply and 
demand of legal norms. The premise of this problem is the 
assumption that formalism demands the production of laws. In this 
context, pragmatic or dogmatic perspectives on the nature of 
transformation stimulate the demand for laws. The second problem 
refers to the nature of transplants.
74
 The multitude of actors and 
methodologies for transplanting laws has created a situation where 
it is impossible to trace the origin of laws. In this case, transplants 
take on a life of their own, losing their original meaning and 
intent.
75
 Frankenberg calls this process of supply and demand of 
expertise and laws as “[j]uridic midwives of capitalism . . .  
monitored by representatives of supra-or international 
organizations they dismantle and overhaul the old normative 
                                                                                                             
72. But see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 97, 109 (1993) (“It follows from the four reflections to this 
point that usually legal rules are not peculiarly devised for the particular society 
in  which  they  now  operate and also that this is not a matter for great concern.”  
“. . . The fact is, I believe, that even in theory there is no simple correlation 
between a society and its law.”). 
73. John Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the 
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 
AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 457, 462 (1977). 
74. Jonathan Miller provides a typology of transplants classifying them 
as cost-saving transplants, externally dictated transplants, legitimacy generating 
transplants, and entrepreneurial transplants. All these types are found 
interchangeably in legal reform projects. Usually the entrepreneurial and 
legitimacy generating transplants are the most used, although the cost-saving is 
often used when there are no administrative capacities able to provide an 
analysis of a particular transplant, save the case of a legitimacy generating 
transplant. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using 
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant 
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 839 (2003). 
75. See Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of 
Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.: HISTORIES OF LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS (2009), available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss2/art14 (last visited April 21, 2011). 
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superstructure, importing, adapting, and transplanting legal 
codes.”76  
A. The Supply and Demand of Transplants: Diversity of Origins–
Diversity of Results 
In one of my early days at the Ministry of Justice in Albania, I 
found a folder containing the traveaux préparatoire of the Election 
Code. Curiosity took the better of me and I started going through 
it. The working group was established under the auspices of the 
OSCE, which was very active in 2000 in establishing the rule of 
law in the country. Several of its experts were involved in drafting 
the Code, which was supposed to cure once and for all whatever 
was wrong with Albanian elections. I could not believe the surprise 
and sheer amazement I felt when I found in the folder the Election 
Code of former Zaire. One needs to be especially skilled in legal 
engineering to extract and adapt Mobutu‟s Zaire electoral rules in 
order to democratize Albania of 2001. However strange this may 
be, it was a part of a larger pattern. The reformatory process in 
Albania was characterized by a diversity of approaches and 
methods in drafting laws. The result consisted of an amalgam of 
laws, broadly taken by the common law tradition and Germanic-
Roman law.
77
 Of course, the first draft of the Election code in 2000 
had the exotic nuances of Zaire.  
A diametrically different experience was in the case of Nepal. 
At the Center of Micro-Finance where I was helping with drafting 
the legal framework on microfinance, a more inclusive, 
participatory process was in place. Most of the relevant 
stakeholders were part of a process in which they learnt of our 
efforts and at the same time they contributed valuable comments 
and suggestions. The draft law was drawn from the experience of 
Nepal and from other neighboring countries. This is not to say that 
                                                                                                             
76. Frankenberg, supra note 13.  
77. For instance, the Civil Code was drafted after the French Code Civil 
in the framework of a Council of Europe project, while simultaneously, GTZ 
experts drafted the first part of the commercial legislation with the registry of 
companies modeled after the French and German legislation. The registration of 
private property recently was developed under the auspices of the USAID, 
whereas the criminal and criminal procedure code were aligned with the Italian 
legislation. 
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the final draft was a combination of transplants, at contrary, the 
law was entirely home grown on the premise that it benefited from 
lessons learned either in Nepal, or in neighboring countries. 
Having in mind the reformatory aspect of the law, the legal 
framework also reflected international standards of accountability 
and good governance. In this way, it was more productive to 
engage with a local product that aimed at achieving higher 
standards for governance.  
There are two direct consequences resulting from the diversity 
of the methodologies and projects of the legal reform. First, there 
is a sense of confusion or alienation that is derived from the 
chaotic nature of the legal system and its incoherence. Second, a 
sense that the lack of action on the part of government or private 
actors is attributed to the vacuum in legislation. This implies an 
urge to adopt more laws in order to bring the country up to date 
with modern standards. As it was mentioned in the first Chapter, 
generating laws is the measurement of success and efficacy of 
public institutions. It is an imposed solution in a closed 
administration and civic society catering to the needs of project 
awarders. This creates a vicious circle, which perpetuates a need to 
adopt new laws every day. In turn, they are practically never 
absorbed by the administration itself, by the elite, or by the public. 
As an example, shortly after I started working in Albania, during 
one of the negotiations in the framework of accession to NATO, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no data regarding the UN 
conventions ratified by Albania. The large number of adopted laws 
and by laws also makes the lawmaking process difficult to 
manage.
78
 It is obvious to say that the process needs management 
in order to ensure effectiveness in adoption and in implementation.  
Pressure from the interaction with international organizations 
and donor countries is being brought to bear on the Executive 
branch as well as the Parliament.
79
 The membership in 
                                                                                                             
78. A direct result, which is connected with the large number of 
normative acts adopted by the Government is the lack of disseminating 
information in the communities of lawyers and judges. A shared complaint by 
the members of the judiciary is the frequent amendment to laws, and the lack of 
codification.  
79. See Robert C. Bergeron, Globalization of the Dialogue on the 
Legislative Process, 23 STATUTE L. REV. 85 (2002). Examples include the need 
to incorporate structural changes and “rule of law” reforms into domestic law as 
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international organizations, such as the WTO for instance, requires 
constant assessment of the existing legislation against the 
international norms. An element worth mentioning here is that 
while there is a vigorous debate in EU circles about the 
relationship of WTO norms not only on states individually, but 
also on the EU and its institutions. In Albania, the relationship of 
domestic law to international law takes a very formalistic, and 
dogmatic perspective.
80
 There is little room for discussion among 
judges and other practitioners on whether international law 
supercedes national law in whatever form, period. The WTO and 
the related treaties, such as WIPO, were ratified in a single session 
in Parliament. The prospective membership in the EU brings with 
it a requirement for a comprehensive rehaul of legislation in order 
to bring it up to EU standards. It also requires the examination of 
the entire legislative process to ensure that future laws meet the 
required standards. In this latter context, beginner‟s luck was to 
accompany me during the first year at the Ministry of Justice. In 
one of the office visits by legal experts, I was abruptly introduced 
to the world of legal reform projects. Under the goal of 
modernizing the legislation, an expert introduced me to the 
inefficiencies of the Albanian insolvencies law which was drafted 
by his organization some years ago (GTZ). He eloquently argued 
that I should inform the Minister about the immediate need to 
amend the legislation in order to align it with the acquis. His 
organization was only too happy to assist us.  
 Newton says: “[t]he very term „transplantation,‟ biased 
towards the technical, masks the political realities, for „legal 
transplantation‟ is always necessarily a species of the genus 
legislation. To speak, as comparativists typically do, of 
transplantation as „reception‟ is to obscure the political calculations 
and complex play of interests behind any modern instance of 
importing statutes (or concepts or provisions).”81 Watson on the 
                                                                                                             
 
a condition for obtaining loans from the World Bank, and the orchestrated 
revision of the monetary, banking and fiscal legislation under the conditionality 
of the IMF. 
80. See generally ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION (2002).  
81. Newton, supra note 12, at 152. 
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other hand makes the case that transplantation has occurred all the 
time and the modern legal systems are the fruits of massive 
transplantations.
82
 Limited in the technicality of the term, the 
reform in changing and aligning legislation with the international 
standards and with the EU acquis becomes easier to be 
conceptualized and adopted. This approach however misses the 
point of how are the transplants incorporated and how are 
implemented.  
The multitude of national strategies and action plans addressing 
particular recommendations can be evaluated twofold.
83
 Firstly, 
there is a lack of coherence among the goals and objectives of legal 
reform programs proposed by the interested actors, which results 
not only in sporadic implementation, but resonates problems in 
codification, and creates the need for repetitious revisions in all 
areas of legislation. Secondly, there is a lack of cohesiveness 
within a single legal reform project, manifested in terms of 
maintaining uniformity and cohesion in conceptualizing goals and 
objectives and drafting legislation.  
The process of adoption of the NPAA and APIEP was typical 
of the Albanian administration. It merits a few words of 
explanation to illustrate the process and methodology.
84
 The 
drafting process of the APIEP started in early May 2004 with the 
aim of finalizing it by early June. The methodology adopted to 
draft the Plan was the result of a “compromise” of two different 
EU technical assistance experts assigned to the Ministry of 
                                                                                                             
82. WATSON, supra note 72.  
83. NPAA, APIEP are instruments regarding the European Union, 
whereas the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development was 
adopted as a requirement from the World Bank. 
84. See generally European Partnerships for Western Balkans, 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/index.htm (last 
visited April 21, 2011). The approximation of legislation is conceptualized in 
the National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), as well as in the 
Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnerships (APIEP). 
These plans contain annual as well as medium term legislative and institutional 
building measures. The launch of European Partnerships in 2004, in addition to 
the annual preparation of National Plan for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAA), has 
put the focus on identifying short and mid-term priorities regarding the 
preparations for further integration with the European Union identified in the 
Commission‟s 2004 Annual Reports and serves as a checklist against which to 
measure progress. The NPAA and the APIEP are developed independently by 
national authorities, subject to revisions and monitoring by the technical joint 
committees associated country-European Commission. 
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European Integration, which had conflicting perspectives and 
proposed different methodologies.
85
 The conflicting 
methodological viewpoint, poor training on the part of ministries‟ 
experts as well as the hermetic process of consultations and 
drafting prevented the working group from coming up with a final 
draft, even four months after the formal start of the project.
86
 The 
question is not simply that if there were only one set of experts 
then the confusion would have been avoided. The problem goes 
deeper into the incoherency of strategic objectives.       
It is significantly easier to adopt legislation that comes from a 
well-established source. The authority of the legislation provides 
not only for a broader acceptance in the Parliament but serves as a 
legitimacy claim by the Executive versus opposition, and towards 
the population at large. The foreign technical expertise, alignment 
with the international standards, and the process of 
Europeanization of the legislation contain sufficient dosages of 
authority to facilitate the adoption of laws. It should be said that 
the alignment of the domestic legislation with international 
standards is not objectionable in itself. On the contrary, the drive 
of formerly oppressed societies towards universalistic virtues 
brings much vitality and needed energy. A flaw of this process is 
the strong emphasis on product over process that dominates the 
reform.
87
 In this context, the gap, or the contradiction, between the 
objectives and results makes the case of a careful review of the 
lawmaking process.  
The focus over the product is closely connected to the 
underlying motives that propel actors to become involved in legal 
reform projects. Furthermore, the legal reform projects overlap not 
only with regard to their substance, but also with regard to the 
actors. Legal reform projects have become a source of income for 
                                                                                                             
85. One of the projects was intended to support Albania with the 
approximation of legislation before the negotiations for the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement were opened, preparing the country for them. Thanks to 
the Brussels bureaucracy it started some three years later, after the negotiations 
started. The second one was of course associated with the development of the 
SAA negotiations as technical support to the administration.  
86. The methodologies used for drafting the Plan were revised on a bi-
weekly basis, acting on differing proposals from the two projects‟ expertise. 
Needless to say it threw the whole administrative network tasked with preparing 
the document into a state of constant chaos and incertitude.  
87. Newton, supra note 12, at 153. 
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many NGOs, founded by former or current ministers, or their 
wives. The quest for funds bypasses gap analyses on the need for a 
particular piece of legislation. The hierarchic and economic 
liaisons of the workplace enable many government experts to offer 
their expertise in the framework of the projects. In a different spin, 
the mobility and rotation in power of existing and former high 
level government civil servants influences the conception and 
implementation of assistance programs and the division of 
projects.  
The following example illustrates the dynamic of actors‟ 
rivalry. In 2000-2001, two leading German organizations, German 
Technical Assistance (GTZ) and the German Foundation for 
International Legal Cooperation entered the market of 
approximation of Albanian legislation with the EU acquis. Both of 
them were funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
were competing for the same assistance for the Department of 
Approximation of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice. The 
competitive situation derogated to the point that the intervention of 
the German Embassy was necessary to basically remove IRZ from 
the approximation of legislation and encourage it to participate in 
other activities in the country. The result of the competition among 
the legal reform providers is not limited to projects working in the 
same area.  
The predominant methodology of drafting laws in Albania 
consisted largely of transplanting laws or provisions from different 
experiences. For instance, the working group on drafting the 
copyright law tried to transplant part of the Italian, Romanian and 
Greek copyright laws.
88
 This approach stands in contrast to the 
process of approximation of legislation with the acquis. The 
requirements of the EU alignment consist of the transposition of 
Treaty provisions, regulations and standards of directives into 
domestic laws.
89
 This form of transposition demands a new 
                                                                                                             
88. The initial version comprising these different parts of the law, was 
rejected as being artificial and not aligned with the international standards in 
copyright regime and with incorporating EU acquis. The working group in 2004 
finalized the drafting of a law, which largely transposed the EC directives in this 
field.  
89. The White Paper of the European Council (1994). The EU White 
Paper is focused on the need to adopt legislation, which is essential for the 
functioning of the internal market. It presents this legislation in a way which 
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strategy of drafting laws that differs from a classical transplant 
based approach. Instead of eyeing similar legislation in different 
Member States, some working groups, for example in the area of 
competition and consumer protection, based their work on 
standards set by relevant directives and regulations. According to 
this approach, the legislation of Member States has a 
complimentary role in providing a comparative bases for 
evaluating different models and in challenging, or affirming the 
assumptions of a particular law, rather than an in promptu 
translation and incorporation into the domestic system.  
Regardless of sporadic episodes of bringing laws closer to the 
social context, the political will and the reformatory goals, the 
trend of legal transplants will continue to influence the lawmaking 
process. The benefits of comparative law can easily be 
demonstrated as lessons learned from other jurisdictions. However, 
it can or should not substitute for drafting laws that reflect the 
social context, the political will and the reformatory goals. The 
accession into the European Union is in itself a great exercise in 
reforming the legislation. The approximation of legislation with 
100,000 pages of acquis is a process that requires first of all, and at 
least, a well-coordinated mechanism in order to prevent frequent 
amendments of legislation and to ensure wide acceptance for the 
necessary reforms.
90
 Wider participation of the concerned actors 
and public can influence the zeal with which the proponents of EU 
advocate swifter lawmaking.  
The tendency to adopt and incorporate as many international 
agreements as possible and EU acquis comes mainly from the lack 
                                                                                                             
 
shows the key measures in each sector and those measures which should be 
tackled first, but it does not attempt to establish priorities as between sectors. It 
also describes in some detail the administrative and organizational structures, 
which are required in each sector if the legislation is to be effectively 
implemented and enforced. 
90. I do not mean here to imply that the problem with harmonization of 
the acquis is exclusively one of coordination, as in that case the remedy would 
not be difficult to find. While I address in other works some of the problems 
associated with the nature of acquis, as a system, or a body of law that can be 
put under a critique of its own regarding its existence as a system, and therefore 
its internal coherence, in this paper as I state in the beginning, I take a process 
oriented perspective on the implementation of legal reform projects, rather than 
a substantive approach to their conceptualization.  
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of deliberations in the legislative process. In the situation when it is 
fairly easy to initiate a draft law under the label “European 
Integration” even the formal requirements of the lawmaking 
process become a mere formality. One can pass almost anything as 
long as it is properly labeled. The heavier (read powerful) the 
authority submitting a draft law, the faster the lawmaking process 
works. They are in direct proportion. In this way, they reflect the 
contradiction between the need to adopt legislation using the fast-
tracking parliamentary procedures, in order to speed the pace of 
integration, and the need for a greater public deliberation, in order 
to ensure the “stakeholders as process owners” perspective.  
B. A Comparative Perspective of the Legislative and Constitution 
Making Process 
In this section, I explore the nuances of the lawmaking process 
in two different contexts. The first is a typical procedure that is 
used for adopting laws, and it includes both the drafting, and the 
passing of the laws by the Parliament. A caveat to that is the 
process of adopting EU acquis, which I explain immediately 
below. The second context is provided by the process, in which the 
Constitution was drafted in 1998. As described earlier in the 
Chapter, the large amount of legislation enacted every year, 
overlooking the process, contributes to the lack of implementation. 
A hypothesis could be raised whether normative acts would have a 
better chance of being implemented if a participatory lawmaking 
process was in place. In the interest of promoting much discussed 
democratic standards of transparency and accountability, such an 
approach could vest the system with more legitimacy.  
The tension between a participatory lawmaking process and the 
product of legal reform projects becomes palpable in the case of 
adoption of the EU acquis. The usual legislative procedure is more 
preoccupied with ensuring the legality of the process, rather than 
establishing the mechanisms for ensuring legitimacy. Prior to the 
start of the negotiations for the SAA the approach to legal reform 
varied from one actor to the other. As noted earlier, the different 
approaches produced a myriad of results. The EU acquis were 
almost never taken into consideration by any working groups or 
legal reform projects. The laws were drafted to resemble particular 
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legislation of different countries, regardless of whether they were 
EU Member States or not.  
In order to convey the commitment to the European 
integration, the Parliament has introduced a de-facto fast-track 
parliamentary procedure to pass legislation that aims at 
approximating domestic laws with the EU acquis or demands. 
Under this procedure, the Parliament has a limited time to review a 
particular draft law introduced by the Council of Ministers. The 
latter has the sole authority to carry out negotiations and maintain 
relations with the EU. According to the annual legislative plans, a 
majority of laws come from the EU conditionality for membership. 
For fairness sake, the EU is not the only international organization 
that wields power. The OSCE, World Bank, IMF, UN, WTO, and 
any other donor country have the prerogative to dictate conditions, 
and a de facto fast-track procedure is established for adopting laws 
coming from these organizations. 
The typical law drafting in Albania starts with the preparation 
and adoption every January by the Council of Ministers of an 
annual legislative plan. It is coordinated through the Department of 
Coordination at the Prime Minister‟s Office with the legal 
departments of the line ministries and the central institutions. 
According to the law “On the Organization and Functioning of the 
Council of Ministers,” each ministry sets up working groups to 
come up with planned legislative measures. Representatives from 
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of European Integration 
are invited to participate in the working groups charged with 
drafting normative acts.  
After the working group completes the draft, it goes for 
revision to the interested line ministries and to the Department of 
Coordination, in order to settle disputes and approve the final 
version before introducing the draft law for approval in the Council 
of Ministers. Although formalized, this procedure is not exclusive 
and there have been numerous occasions when draft laws are 
introduced outside of this procedure. A sine qua non of the 
legislative process is the opinion of the Ministry of Justice for all 
normative acts and of the Ministry of European Integration for 
those normative acts that affect one of the areas of the acquis.  
Pending review and approval by the Council of Ministers, a 
draft law is submitted to the relevant Parliamentary commissions 
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with jurisdiction on the subject area of the draft law and always to 
the Legal Affairs Commissions. Although members of Parliament 
have the legislative initiative, very few laws are adopted by the 
MP‟s initiative. It could be stated that the Parliament in a 
Parliamentary Republic has relinquished its legislative role by 
giving the Executive branch a quasi monopoly on legislation.  
Formally, meetings of parliamentary commissions are open and 
MPs reserve the right to invite experts to discuss proposed laws. 
The process is intended to be deliberative. Actually, proceedings 
before parliamentary commissions are routine matters, where there 
is almost no deliberation. Rarely does anyone read the texts of a 
proposed legislative acts. Unless a proposed law is of a political 
nature, all others are adopted, almost always unanimously. After 
adoption by the relevant commissions, a report is prepared 
regarding the status of the draft law. In case members of the 
commissions have reservations regarding the draft law, they are 
included in the report.   
Regarding the incorporation of international agreements into 
the domestic law, the situation is even simpler. Few would dare to 
run counter the “will” of integration and the internationalization of 
the legal system. A draft law incorporating the agreement is sent 
for opinion to the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of foreign 
Affairs. The process of reviewing the international agreements is 
practically non-existent. The pressure to modernize the laws, and 
to have friendly relations with all international organizations and 
donor countries, influences the depth of reviewing the contents of 
international agreements. The proceedings before the 
Parliamentary commissions also in this case are quite fast and 
without much debate.  
In this respect, the membership in the WTO was a perfect 
example of the hermetic nature of the legislative process. Most of 
the interested communities, the local producers, did not have a 
chance to participate in the negotiations and the preparatory work 
for concluding the membership agreement. Six yeas after the 
accession to the WTO, most of the business community frequently 
demands the renegotiation of the membership agreement, and the 
renegotiation of all free trade agreements with various countries. 
The seriousness of the matter was taken into consideration by 
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political parties in their election campaigns of July 2005, 
promising to renegotiate all the concerned agreements.  
From a purely formalist position, it should be noted that there 
is no law guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to become part of 
the process of drafting laws, and this affects all ministries. As there 
is no legal provision that would require the Ministry of Justice to 
regulate public participation in drafting laws, the Ministry of 
Justice sees itself under no legal obligation to do so. 
Access to law is an essential element of any state governed by 
the rule of law, and a problematic area that I tried to raise in this 
paper. However, despite the obvious benefits of an open minded 
approach to public participation, a right to public participation is 
not a recipe for success, and it‟s worth looking at some of its dark 
sides and blind spots. Apart from the traditional means of 
publicizing the law such as “official gazettes,” information 
technology is now extensively used to enable wide-ranging 
possibilities for electronic access to legal texts. Public participation 
should not be taken to mean voting, as for example electing a 
constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by a 
referendum. At its best, participatory constitutionalism works and 
counteracts the arguments in support of elite negotiation as the sole 
effective model. 
The Constitution making process reflects the greater 
participation that attempted to lend legitimacy to the product. 
Although, by contrast to the traditional process of lawmaking, the 
Constitution making process was much more participatory and 
deliberative, the political boycotting by the opposition party 
contributed to the anemic nature of the final product.
91
 With this 
caution in mind, it is worth contrasting these two lawmaking 
processes to highlight the nature of participation and deliberation. 
It is also necessary to emphasize the important role of mechanisms 
that are needed to ensure the right to participate and deliberate. 
During the process of drafting the Albanian Constitution, 
Frankenberg wrote about the rules that would guide the legislative 
process: (1) institutions must be simple; (2) functions must be 
                                                                                                             
91. It should be said that while the Constitution suffers from a lack of 
enforcement, due to its problematic substantive elements, and the initial political 
taint, the process of making it represents an interesting practice worth studying 
and illustrating. 
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clearly divided among the institutions; (3) the legislative process 
must be transparent; (4) the legislative process must be efficient (as 
guaranteed by public scrutiny); and (5) popular participation must 
be permitted.
92
  
Despite the practice of a participatory lawmaking process that 
characterized the Constitution making process, the supreme law of 
the country does not contain a single provision for the public 
access in the lawmaking process. The process of drafting the 
Constitution took into account the need for a wide participatory 
approach in order to best exploit the resources of local and 
international NGOs, and reflect the perspectives of the local 
experts and of the public in a more general tone.  
The Administrative Center for the Coordination of Assistance 
and Public Participation (ACCAPP), a joint initiative of 
ABA/CEELI, GTZ, and OSCE, served as a liaison between and 
among Albanian and international participants in the constitutional 
drafting process.
93
 Its function was to ensure that all interested 
parties had the opportunity to participate fully and to avoid 
duplicative and conflicting initiatives.
94
 As such it was working to 
create a program of public participation. It solicited assistance 
from Albanian NGOs and international donors to provide 
materials, training, and financial assistance to develop strategies 
for organizing assistance and promoting public participation in the 
constitutional drafting process.
95
  
The program that they managed to put together consisted of 
two phases, collecting input into the drafting of the Constitution, 
and submitting draft provisions to the public for comment.
96
 
                                                                                                             
92. Günter Frankenberg, notes from THE THREE POWERS SYMPOSIUM 
ON THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ALBANIA (May 13-15, 1998). 
93. Scott Carlson & Molly Inman, Forging a Democratic Constitution: 
Transparency and Participation in the 1998 Albanian Constitutional Process. In 
the Fall of 2003, the US Institute of Peace in cooperation with the UNDP 
organized a series of workshops with experts on constitution making practices. I 
was invited to participate as a country expert in the workshop of the Constitution 
making in Albania. In the workshop we discussed the findings of Scot Carlson‟s 
paper, as well as debated the legitimacy questions of public participation and the 
politicization of the Constitution making process.  
94. SCOTT CARLSON & MOLLY INMAN, FORGING A DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE 1998 ALBANIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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Throughout the duration of the program, its officers traveled all 
over Albania to generate public awareness and participation in the 
constitution making process. The results of these fora provided 
Commission members and its technical staff with a basic outline of 
the issues that the public considered important.
97
 In a second 
phase, the review of the constitution was largely done by 
individuals and organizations either in Albania or abroad.
98
 This 
public review was in addition to the drafting consultations 
provided by foreign experts.
99
 This approach by the ACCAPP 
provided at least a mechanism to ensure wider participation in the 
lawmaking process. 
Although the Constitution drafting project involved input 
gathering on a national scale, it did not provide answers to the 
methodologies adopted to filter the information gathered from the 
public participation into the drafting. The problem was threefold. 
The first was the relation of the political class to the final outcome. 
The Democratic Party, the major opposition force in the country 
was opposed to a Constitution being drafted by the Socialist, 
whom they considered to have come to power through a Bolshevik 
like revolution after the collapse of the financial sector in early 
1997. They did not consider the government to be legitimate, and 
they did not support the process as they perceived it to being 
controlled and manipulated by the Socialists and their allies, even 
among the international actors. Hence, the final product, the 
Constitution, which was adopted formally by a referendum on 28 
November 2008, purposely coinciding with the National 
Independence Day, did not have the full backing of the political 
elite. The second was the perceived role of the international 
community in legitimizing the process and product. The public 
perception at that time was that while making a constitution is 
generally viewed with optimism, the process and product were 
perceived to be too much controlled by the government and the 
international actors. In other words, the public perception was that 
yes, it is good that a constitution is being drafted, but we do not 
have any influence in it whatsoever. The third was the relation of 
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2011] TRANSITION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION 101 
 
 
 
selected expertise and opinions generated in town hall meetings 
and the final product. Despite the fact that this exercise formally 
introduced the concept of the public as a participant in the 
lawmaking process, and as such constituted a break from the 
established mentality of closed doors working groups, without 
adequate methodological framework and proper safeguards it did 
not guarantee that the public input would find its way in the final 
draft.
100
  
The legal framework establishes virtually no formal 
opportunities for public participation in governmental and 
parliamentary decision-making.
101
 The relationship between the 
government, NGOs, and the public is a complicated one. Because 
of the lack of procedures for incorporating public input, relations 
between the government and the public and NGO community 
depend heavily on the discretion of governmental officials. The 
predominant attitude among government and parliamentary 
officials is that public participation hinders the lawmaking process 
instead of improving it. Moreover, public administration tends to 
show interest in public participation in the lawmaking and policy 
preparations process only when it expects that the public will 
approve of their intended decisions. 
The law on the Council of Ministers, and the regulations on 
Parliamentary commissions do not prohibit the participation of 
other experts in the drafting process, but in the absence of an 
explicit provision and mechanism to ensure it, the right to invite 
outside experts is left to the discretion of MPs. There is a 
contradiction in the proceedings of the working groups. When a 
particular law is part of a legal reform project, the project experts 
                                                                                                             
100. For instance, Frankenberg‟s article Stranger than Paradise, 
provides an example of a typical working group. Two to three local experts and 
a foreign consultant, tasked with drafting a major law, such as the 
Administrative Procedure Code. This practice until early 2000 was well 
trenched in the set up and proceedings of the working groups.  
101. Law no. 9000, dated 30/01/2003 “On the Organization and 
Functioning of the Council of Ministers”. Article 24 of the law provides: 
1. The initiators send the draft acts along with an explanatory 
memo on the goal, objectives and the substance of the draft act for 
opinion to the interested ministries and other institutions. 
2. In any case, the draft acts, with the exception of those with an 
individual character, are sent for opinion to the Ministry of Justice, 
on the legality of their form and substance. 
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have a rather strong voice in the proceedings and in the final 
outcome of the law. However, if an interested NGO or a concerned 
community were to ask to participate in some of the meetings of 
the working groups, the decision to invite or not would be the 
chairperson‟s alone. Taking into consideration the past practices of 
lawmaking, the need for public consultations should be explicitly 
provided in the law rather than left to the discretion of the 
administration. The only direct participation by the public in 
governance and government consists on electing representatives to 
the Parliament. 
V. CHAPTER THREE: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE 
LAWMAKING PROCESS 
How legislation is made, and of course what it says, are equally 
important and complementary. Process has become equally as 
important as the content of the final document for the legitimacy of 
legislation.
102
 The previous Chapters analyzed the contradiction 
among rules, and the deficits of the legislative process. In this 
Chapter, I discuss some perspectives on filling the gap between the 
law in the book and the law in action through greater participation 
in lawmaking and evaluation of legislation. From a political 
science perspective, Archon Fung juxtaposes the representative 
democracy with the participatory democracy. Fung highlights the 
democratic deficit of the policy making process where preferences 
are not matched by outcomes and where deliberation or 
participation is absent from the lawmaking process. Underlying the 
potential disruption of representative institutions, Fung nonetheless 
proposes that “for countries where patron-client exchanges are 
highly stable, entrenched and reinforcing dynamics of a policy-
                                                                                                             
102. Writers such as Daniel Berkowitz and Katharina Pistor have 
respectively focused on the legality and effectiveness aspects of the legal 
reform, and the need for legal professionals to embrace the laws in order to 
ensure effectiveness. This is another occasion to emphasize that my focus in this 
paper has been on the need to ensure broader participation by the public in order 
to enhance the legitimacy of the process and products of legal reform projects, 
rather than their legality. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 1, 163 (2003); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its 
Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 97 (2002).  
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making process, participatory reform may be an effective 
corrective.”103  
In the context of an emerging right for public participation in 
democratic governance, Thomas Franck wrote that the legitimacy 
of governments will be measured by international law and 
process.
104
 The right to public participation in democratic 
governance exists today in international law. This right packs a 
moral punch but it lacks legal teeth and effective enforcement. 
Does this right extend from everyday governance to the process of 
constitution making? The United Nations Committee on Human 
Rights has recognized a specific right to participate in constitution 
making. The Aarhus Convention, even though a regional 
instrument, fortified the concept of public participation.
105
  
 
                                                                                                             
103. Archon Fung, Democratizing the Policy Process, in PUBLIC POLICY 
669 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). On an extreme use of anti-representative 
institutions, Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller discuss the role of populist politics 
as opposed to progressive politics and representative democracy in undermining 
the legislature ability to set the policy agenda, frame policy options, balance 
competing interests, and protect minority rights. Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. 
Miller, Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative 
Government, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT 
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 33 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001). 
104. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 50 (1992). 
105. A ruling in 1991 of the UNCHR, acting in its judicial capacity to 
hear individual complaints under Optional Protocol I to the ICCPR, in the case 
of Marshall v. Canada (Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986, 3 
December 1991). This was a case brought in 1986 and decided five years later, 
first authorized a specific right to participate in constitution making as an 
undoubted part of public affairs. The right to participate in constitution making 
might logically be derived from the general meaning of “democratic 
participation” in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 21) and 
especially Article 25 of the ICCPR (a covenant agreed in 1966 and entered into 
force in 1976). Article 25 establishes a right to participate in public affairs, to 
vote, and to have access to public service: “Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to 
vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public 
service in his country.” The right of public to participate was also recognized by 
the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on 25 
June 1998. 
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A. International Arrangements on Participation and 
Evaluation 
 
It is of interest to study how international law deals with the 
access to legal norms and what we can learn from the EU response. 
The right of public participation to legal norms and legislative 
process has been recognized in international law. Such an 
instrument is the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. It was adopted on 25 June 1998, in the 
Danish city of Aarhus at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in the 
“Environment for Europe” process. The Convention, although it 
relates to the environmental issues, represents the most advanced 
instrument that regulates the right to public participation. Since 
signing the Convention in 1998, the EU has taken important steps 
to update existing legal provisions in order to meet the 
requirements of the Aarhus Convention by adopting directives for 
the Member States, but also for its own institutions. In particular, 
two directives
106
 concerning access to environmental information 
and public participation in environmental decision-making (“first” 
and “second pillar” of the Aarhus Convention) were adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in 2003. They have to be 
implemented in national law respectively by 14 February and 25 
June 2005. 
The Convention adopts a rights-based approach and establishes 
minimum standards to be achieved, but does not prevent any Party 
from adopting measures which go further in the direction of 
providing access to information, public participation or access to 
justice.
107
 Article 6 of the Convention establishes certain public 
participation requirements for decision-making on whether to 
license or permit certain types of activity listed in Annex I to the 
Convention. The “public concerned” is defined as „the public 
affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the 
                                                                                                             
106. Council & Parliament Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 On 
Public Access to Environmental Information and Repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC, (OJ L 41 of 14.02.2003, p. 26), Directive 2003/35/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003.  
107. The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (1998). 
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environmental decision-making,‟ and explicitly includes NGOs 
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements 
under national law.
108
  
The public participation requirements include: timely and 
effective notification of the public concerned; reasonable 
timeframes for participation, including provision for participation 
at an early stage; the right for the public concerned to inspect 
information which is relevant to the decision-making process free 
of charge; an obligation of the decision-making body to take due 
account of the outcome of the public participation; and prompt 
public notification of the decision, with the text of the decision and 
the reasons and considerations on which it is based being made 
publicly accessible.
109
 What is important in this picture for us is to 
take into consideration the spirit and scope of its provisions. 
The aim of all legislative work is to produce relatively good 
laws, because to produce absolutely good laws means to attain 
justice and justice is an ideal.
110
 The mechanic process of adopting 
laws in Albania has contributed to a large number of adopted laws 
over a relatively short period of time. As the previous Chapters 
illustrated, this tendency has provoked a lack of transparency, and 
this also is reflected in the quality of legislation. Part of the blame 
can be attributed to the handicaps of the lawmaking process: i.e. 
the deficiencies in the functioning of the supply and demand 
scheme for legal norms, which contribute to what I call the 
inflation of legislation. The problems are also reflected in the 
inadequate time for reflection and reviews, as well as in a greater 
isolation between the Executive and other branches of the 
government.  
According to the Council of Europe, evaluation of the effects 
of laws is a relatively recent development in Europe. Its growing 
importance is related to changes in the form of legislation. Modern 
legislation has taken the form of programs, which are targeted to 
achieve certain goals; therefore, the traditional verification of the 
legality of legislation should be gradually accompanied or 
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combined with the evaluation of the effects of legislation.
111
 The 
most frequently mentioned evaluation criteria are the effectiveness, 
efficacy and efficiency. The focus is on the content of the law 
rather than on the procedures of collecting the input of the target 
populations into the given legislation.  
The approach taken by the Council of Europe with respect to 
evaluation of legislation restricts itself to the effect and the 
implementation of the legislation. Little is said about the need to 
evaluate the legislative process itself. This approach focuses on the 
technicality of the lawmaking process, leaving outside political, 
economical, and social factors that are the driving forces of 
legislation.
112
 
In this context, legislative evaluation is seen as an 
indispensable aspect of the democratic debate. In order to fully 
play its part in ensuring legal certainty, evaluation cannot be 
restricted to purely financial concerns or consistency of the legal 
order, but must also monitor how efficacious, efficient and 
effective a given norm is, as well as any other expected or 
unexpected effects. There should be provisions for evaluation at 
the time of travaux préparatoires, so as to foresee the effects (ex 
ante evaluation), and during the implementation, so as to be able to 
draw conclusions about the legislation‟s content and the 
implementation methods (ex post evaluation).
113
  
In this framework, evaluation of legislation is thought to be an 
element of the sociology of legislation as well as an essential part 
of legislative methodology. Unlike legislative drafting, it concerns 
the material and substantial aspects of legislation rather than its 
formal aspects. It is particularly concerned with the relation 
between normative contents and their consequences in the social 
                                                                                                             
111. Id.  
112. Id. Legislative evaluation is a necessary discipline, but it has still to 
be widely developed in all European countries. Every Council of Europe 
member state or candidate for membership should independently look into the 
question and set itself the goal, when drafting legislation, of establishing 
machinery that makes it possible to have a better understanding of the 
legislation‟s impact. As part of its ADACS legal co-operation program, the 
Council of Europe might encourage and support these efforts by organizing both 
bilateral activities and discussion among all the countries in the program, and by 
developing, in partnership with national and NGO bodies concerned, networks 
for monitoring and exchange of information and experience . . . ” 
113. Supra note 110. 
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reality, in the “real world.”114 Therefore, it is imperative to 
emphasize the nexus between the substance and procedure of 
lawmaking.  
 The analytical or theoretical model underlying the methodical 
approach to be used for preparing legislation considers the 
legislative process as a reiterative learning process.
115
 It is a 
process in which the evaluation of the effects of legislation is one 
of the fundamental prerequisites and tools for learning. A process, 
in which the responsiveness of the legislator to social reality and 
the social adequacy of legislative action should be guaranteed.  
Taking into consideration that the Europeanization of 
legislation is the single biggest legal reform, much attention is 
needed to provide a scrupulous process of reviewing legislation 
initiated by the executive in the framework of the Europeanization 
of legislation.
116
 The establishment of the necessary domestic 
participatory and evaluation mechanism becomes relevant when 
considering that the EU does its homework quite well. Through the 
introduction of TAIEX programs in Albania, EU evaluates the 
Albanian legislation on an automatic basis.
117
 Every month, line 
ministries and the Ministry of European Integration are obliged to 
update a list of all normative acts adopted by the Council of 
Ministers and the Parliament in a database monitored by the 
European Commission TAIEX office. This process evaluates how 
many laws are adopted in a particular area and their level of 
compatibility with the acquis. During the implementation of the 
Stabilization and Association Process joint working groups and 
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116. In addition to international instruments on evaluating legislation, 
renown law and development scholars, Bob and Ann Seidman, have done 
remarkable work in preparing manuals for lawyers on drafting and evaluating 
legislation. ROBERT SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (Kluwer Law International 2001); 
and ASSESSING LEGISLATION: A MANUAL FOR LEGISLATORS (Boston University 
School of Law 2003).  
117. TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
instrument managed by the Directorate-General Enlargement of the European 
Commission. TAIEX supports partner countries with regard to the 
approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is largely 
demand driven and facilitates the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise 
to address issues at short notice. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/what-is-
taiex/index_en.htm (last visited April 21, 2011). 
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committees evaluate the implementation of the agreement and ex 
officio as well as the enforcement of legislation. The concern here 
is not about preserving nationalist, or culturalist sensitivities. It is 
more about providing alternatives and achieving a higher standard 
of comparison and evaluation rather than the basic level of 
alignment with the acquis.  
There are few aspects that merit attention when talking about 
the effectiveness of evaluation. What I find missing and consider 
worth noticing is the important question of the subjects of the 
evaluation. Answers to these questions raise identity prerogatives 
for the executive and parliament. In this context, taking into 
account the shift in power from the legislature to the executive 
branch, regulatory agencies and the courts, it is about time to give 
something back to the lawmakers.  
B. Reflections on Public Participation 
The typology of critique against public participation is usually 
made in the context of lawmaking initiatives in America. Whereas 
my argument does not involve direct democracy, but calls for 
greater participation in the lawmaking process using the existing 
institutions of the representative democracy, nonetheless it is 
worthwhile to bring up the critique and discuss how it is refuted. 
The critique against forms of direct democracy in lawmaking 
highlights the role of special interests in formulating policies, the 
inexperience and incompetence of voters in conceptualizing policy 
proposals and formulating laws, and the risk for infringing 
minority rights.
118
 In an empirical study, Elisabeth Gerner refutes 
the critique by showing that the evidence fails to support the 
claims that there are more special interests involved in lawmaking 
initiatives, and that the voters are uninformed.
119
 Whereas, there 
                                                                                                             
118. Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Logic of Reform: Assessing Initiative 
Reform Strategies, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT 
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 143 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001). 
119. Id. Furthermore, in the context of greater participation in the 
lawmaking process, an experiment was conducted in British Columbia where a 
Citizens‟ Assembly was created by the Government of British Columbia with 
the unanimous support of the B.C. Legislature. It was an independent, non-
partisan assembly of citizens who examined the province‟s electoral system. The 
Citizens‟ Assembly had 160 members, one man and one woman from each of 
B.C‟s 79 provincial electoral districts (constituencies) plus two Aboriginal 
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could be a potential to harm minority interests, Gerner uses a 
Madisonian argument to conclude that risks could be mitigated by 
controlling the effects rather than the causes of antiminority 
tendencies.
120
  
According to Fuller, non-publication of law, contradictory 
rules, and a gap between law and implementation are among the 
elements that contribute to failing to make law.
121
 In the context of 
implementation, well-designed institutions are not the only answer, 
since the best institutions will fail in making law effective unless 
both officials and citizens display general attitudes of respect and 
compliance, unless, that is, they have a view of legal rules as 
binding.  
Every single report on Albania evidences the relatively sound 
legal base, and the drastic lack of implementation. There are 
several factors that contribute to the failure of law, starting from 
socio-anthropological arguments on the attitude of Mediterranean 
populations towards formalized rules, lack of clarity in adopted 
legislation, lack of administrative capacities and resources, 
incoherence of proposed laws and of the system they intend to 
build, as well as a lack of political will to implement the reforms 
and recommendations of the international community. In a report 
about the state of the judiciary in Albania, the lack of 
professionalism and discipline, lack of implementation, conflicting 
and arbitrary legal interpretations, the lack of coherence and 
consistency in the law itself and its application form a set of 
                                                                                                             
 
members. They were representative of the province as a whole, and worked for 
all British Columbians. Members were picked by random draw from a pool that 
reflected the gender, age and geographical make-up of British Columbia. They 
spent 11 months in 2004 studying electoral systems in use around the world, 
holding public hearings, accepting public submissions, and finally reached a 
decision on a new electoral system, which was put to voters in a referendum. 
The process was divided into three phases where they learnt about the electoral 
systems, held public hearings, and deliberated on the new system. This 
experiment emphasized the relevance of greater participation in the lawmaking 
process and the use of alternative mechanisms to the usual institutions of a 
representative democracy. Information Data available at 
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/inaction (last visited April 21, 2011). 
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121. L.L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven: Yale University 
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challenges for the law enforcement authorities.
122
 The list is long, 
and one can attribute the failure to almost anything. Distinguishing 
chaff from grain is the persuasiveness and cohesiveness of 
arguments. The “production” of laws, as commodities, has 
certainly negatively influenced their coherence and quality vis-à-
vis clarity and precision. Legislative problems are universal 
problems; they should be dealt with in a multidisciplinary way, as 
they have a theoretical as well as a practical dimension. 
The legislative loophole in the Albanian legislation regarding 
the participation in the lawmaking process has contributed to 
minimal initiatives to get the public to participate in the legislative 
drafting process throughout the years. Adding to the confusion, it 
has also led to inadequate publicizing of draft laws and poorly 
developed media contacts that would allow the process to be open 
to the public, not mentioning the failure to publish adopted law and 
by laws. With the exception of some isolated cases, the public 
generally has not played an active part in the process of legislative 
drafting.
123
 This pattern fuels the hypotheses that enacted laws lack 
sufficient transparency and are predestined not to be implemented.  
In order to open this process and ensure that the public has a 
voice in the process of drafting legislation the executive should and 
in some sporadic cases has started working to provide proper 
conditions to achieve participation, especially through the open 
invitations via such simple mass media as internet. The lack of a 
clear obligation or the lack of capacities cannot constitute excuses 
for not allowing interested groups to play an active role in 
lawmaking. Developing the necessary legal standards for 
determining when public participation is required and educating 
the public about the importance of public participation in 
legislative drafting are of primary importance, and would directly 
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contribute to the quality and legitimacy of the laws. In the words of 
Vivien Hart “[t]he context of a traditional constitution, presumed 
to stand above and to structure democratic politics, the extension 
of democratic process to include free, open, and responsive 
discussion of the constitutional settlement itself represents a radical 
departure, but one that attempts to overcome the problems of entry 
of new participants and of an equal voice for all concerned 
regardless of their expertise.”124 It would also encourage citizens to 
participate in the various associations that would be involved in the 
process of commenting on legislation, thereby instilling important 
civic virtues.
125
  
Innovative ways to bring about great participation are usually 
commendable, but when in shortage, valuable tools can be used 
from other practices. Comparisons with the U.S. notice and 
comment practices can thus be a starting point.
126
 In order to make 
these methods work efficiently in practice, there must be proper 
methodological mechanisms guaranteeing sufficient and real 
participation. The most important ones are the dissemination of 
information (public notice of and access to the latest drafts, either 
through the production and publication of information leaflets or 
through media and internet coverage), the creation of concrete 
possibility of organizations and interested parties to comment on 
existing draft laws at various stages, and ensuring that hearings are 
held at a time and in a manner that it is truly possible for comments 
to be evaluated and the final decisions to be influenced.
127
  
It should be stressed that these are not simply matters of 
ensuring citizen rights, though they do enhance democratic 
principles. By allowing sufficient participation in the drafting 
process, the public administration can avoid considerable amounts 
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of criticism after laws have been passed. Participation also ensures 
the anticipation of a wider range of potential problems with the 
draft laws, thus lessening the need to amend legislation at a later 
stage. Despite the criticism of participatory-like arrangements and 
their shortcomings in lawmaking procedures, the situations that I 
analyzed earlier in the paper indicate an urgent need to reform the 
reform. Extracting the legislative process from the incubator to a 
more open and mature environment cannot help but bring healthier 
products and legitimacy to them.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The co-existence of parallel processes in the modernization 
project, transformation and deliberation, formalism and 
informalism, legality and legitimacy, is nothing new, but what is 
experienced daily in most of the transitioning societies. The 
relationship of local values with prescriptions from the center is 
subject to a legitimacy test. In other words, there has to be a 
process where the local permeates the universal, and where the 
universal at the same time gradually influences the local.
128
 
Therefore, how law is made does matter. It matters whether groups 
and the population at large are able to contribute to the process.
129
 
A claim of necessity for participation is based on the assumption 
that the outcomes will have the legitimacy as coming from the 
right way of channeling the political power that resides in 
individuals. Thus participation has the potential, although not 
exclusively, to become a criterion of a legitimacy process. 
Lawmaking can no longer be confined exclusively to the domain 
of “high politics” and negotiations among elites. What needs to be 
avoided is exactly the tendency to favor legality over legitimacy.  
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